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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
pay back the supplement of the just price, this might often be
greater than any profit he might have received on resale.27 For
example, A sells to B an immovable for $4,000. B sells to a third
party for $7,000. The just price of the the immovable is $10,000.
If B were compelled to pay A the supplement of the just price,
he would have to pay $6,000. Yet, by following the approach
outlined above and used in O'Brien, if B only had to account for
the profits, he would pay A $3,000.
Therefore, it is submitted that the result reached by the
court is a just one. There is no reason, either on theoretical or
equitable grounds, for holding a purchaser who has not prac-
ticed violence or fraud to the stringent requirement of paying
the supplement of the just price when he cannot, in fact, return
the immovable. The vendor is still protected in that he can de-
mand the profits whenever the purchaser resells.
David Levingston
TERMINATION OF A DEcLARED UNIT
In current practice voluntary units for drilling for and pro-
ducing oil and gas fall into either of two categories: "contractual"
or "declared." "Contractual" units are formed by an agreement
among all the parties who have an interest in the unit (lessors and
lessees).1 "Declared" units result from exercise by a mineral
lessee of a pooling power, usually granted in the lease, and are
normally effectuated by filing of a pooling declaration in the
public records. Once a voluntary unit has been formed, there
is uncertainty as to what events or occurrences will terminate
the unit. It is within the power of contracting parties to pro-
vide expressly for conditions which will resolve any type of
voluntary unit or vary the basis upon which production or costs
are to be shared. For example, the unit agreement may contain
a provision either limiting its duration to a fixed number of years
or perpetuating it until a commissioner's unit might be formed
or unit production might cease.2 Also, the parties may simply
27. See Justice Summers' dissent in O'Brien v. LeGette, 254 La. 252, 260,
223 So.2d 165, 169 (1969).
1. Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 935, 937 (1964). See Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion
Parish School Bd., 145 So.2d 383, 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (concurring
opinion); Comment, 10 LOYOLA L. REV. 224 (1960).
2. See 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW-POOLING AND UNITI-
ZATION § 931 (1964).
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rescind the unit agreement or terminate the old unit to form
another one.8 Contractual unit agreements are typically very
detailed, and there is usually some provision indicating an intent
on the part of the signatory parties as to what events will bring
about a termination or alteration of the unit agreement or under
which the effect of most future events on the rights of the parties
can be determined. To the contrary, in units formed by decla-
ration under a pooling power, standard lease forms4 do not con-
tain any express conditions regarding termination of units or
alteration of sharing arrangements. There is, however, a state-
ment as to the purposes for which the unit may be formed, es-
sentially, for the purpose of conservation. The concern of this
Note is to determine whether, in light of the stated purposes for
which units may be declared by the lessee, certain events or oc-
currences should be interpreted as resolving a declared unit be-
cause the purpose for which it was formed can no longer be
served.
In McDonald v. Grande Corp.,5 plaintiff-lessor argued that
the unit created by the defendant-lessee together with adjoining
lessees, pursuant to the pooling power granted by their respective
leases, terminated upon the drilling of a dry hole on the unit acre-
age. The court of appeal, recognizing the novel question pre-
sented, rejected plaintiff's demand and, relying on the opinion
of the trial court, found that there was no evidence to show that
the unit had become "inappropriate to serve its original intended
purpose" and "until such a revision [of the unit] should come
about, the agreement must be enforced in accordance with the
terms there provided, and as said in the Creslenn case, without
concern as to the disproportionate advantages which may ulti-
mately result."7
The decision by the court that the unit agreement under
consideration was not terminated by the completion of a dry
3. Jackson v. Hunt Oil Co., 208 La. 156, 23 So.2d 31 (1945).
4. See Bath-Form 42 CPM-New South Louisiana Revised Five (5)-
Pooling.
5. 214 So.2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). This case was originally con-
sidered on motion for summary judgment. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 148
So.2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 244 La. 128, 150 So.2d 588 (1962).
6. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 214 So.2d 795, 806 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
The unit agreement expressly provided that its purpose was "to provide
maximum conservation, and to insure to each of the parties hereto its fair
share of the gas and gas condensate produced from the unitized property."
Id.
7. Id. at 807.
1970]
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hole may be questionable under the circumstances presented in
the case, as the opinion does not reveal evidence indicating that
a significant portion of the unit was not unproductive. However,
the court found that the purpose for the unit's existence had not
ceased and reached this result by characterizing the unit agree-
ment as an aleatory contract, concluding that the parties intended
that their interests be frozen. This reasoning may indicate that
the decision stands for the general proposition that the drilling
of a dry hole will not under any circumstances terminate a de-
clared unit. It is this proposition with which the writer takes
issue. An aleatory contract is defined in the Louisiana Civil
Code as a "mutual agreement of which the effects with respect
both to the advantages and losses, whether to all the parties or
to one or more of them, depend on an uncertain event."" The
court in McDonald by designating the unit formed by declaration
as an aleatory contract found that the parties had intended to
"freeze" their interests in the unit. But it did not adequately
consider the question of whether a declared unit terminates upon
the failure of the purposes for its formation. In attempting to
justify its decision the court analogized the unit agreement in
McDonald to the operating agreement under consideration in
Southwest Gas Prod. Co., v. Creslenn.9 This comparison is not
apposite in light of the different factual situations that existed
in these two cases. In construing an operating agreement, the
court in Creslenn held that "so long as the elements of error or
fraud are not involved, it is the purpose of the law to enforce
voluntary agreements without concern as to the disproportionate
advantages which may ultimately result."'10 The court concluded
that because "all the parties to the agreement were experienced
operators, completely familiar with both the possible hazards
and benefits involved in oil and gas operations,"" they should
be presumed to have intended to freeze their interests in the ab-
sence of any provision in the contract to the contrary. The court's
reliance in McDonald on the statement of another court about
an operating agreement seems to this writer to be an improper
analogy. An operating agreement is formed by experienced oil
and gas operators for the purpose of designating an operator to
drill for minerals and to manage the well if production is ob-
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2982.
9. 181 So.2d 63 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
10. Id. at 68.
11. Id. at 67.
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tained. If by the provisions of such an agreement, the parties ex-
press the intent to freeze their interests, they should be forced
to abide by the terms of their contract. Such was the case in
Creslenn. In McDonald, there was no problem as to the formula
by which the parties would participate in production. The ques-
tion was whether, if there were failure of the purpose for which
the unit was formed, this would bring into operation a resolutory
condition that would terminate the unit.
A better approach would have been to rely on Humble Oil
and Refining Co. v. Jones12 in which a declared unit was involved,
as opposed to the operating agreement under consideration in
Creslenn. The court in Humble, upholding a commissioner's
unit over a declared unit, held that when the commissioner had
found the true participation, "the parties should not be presumed
to have agreed to share their interest on the old declared unit
unless they show a specific and positive intention to freeze the
old unit."13 The court added: "It does not appear . . . that the
lessor could be said to have frozen his royalty interests in the
voluntary unit unless he so declared in the lease agreement. The
very purpose for which a lessor signs an individual lease contract
with his lessee with a pooling agreement therein is for the pur-
pose of getting his equitable and just share of oil and gas in the
pool and to prevent drainage of his land.1' 4 In distinguishing
the unit agreement in Humble as opposed to the operating agree-
ment involved in Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Southern Natural
Gas Co.,' 5 the court concluded that with respect to the latter,
"It properly should be assumed that the operators intended to
freeze their original participations unless they expressly con-
tracted to the contrary."' 6
Even though the court in Humble did not use the articles of
the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with resolutory conditions, the
effect of its decision is that once the purpose of a declared unit
can no longer be fulfilled, in the absence of a provision to the
contrary, a superimposed commissioner's unit will terminate it
by bringing into operation a resolutory condition implied by the
12. 157 So.2d 110 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), cert denied, 245 La. 568, 159
So.2d 284 (1964), aff'g 125 So.2d 640 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
13. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Jones, 125 So.2d 640, 646 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1960).
14. Id. at 647.
15. 234 La. 939, 102 So.2d 223 (1958).




parties through their statement of the purposes for which such
units can be created. The unit in McDonald had been formed to
.. . provide maximum conservation and to insure to each of
the parties thereto its fair share of the gas and gas condensate
produced from the unitized property."'1 7 It is submitted that
the failure of the purpose (for the unit) should be construed as
the occurrence of a resolutory condition terminating the unit.
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2047, "When the
resolutory condition is an event, not depending on the will of
either party, the contract is dissolved of right." Such conditions
may be implied "wherever they result from the operation of law,
from the nature of the contract or from the presumed intent of the
parties."' 8 A resolutory condition should be found in the type
of pooling clause involved in McDonald to the effect that if the
purposes for which the unit was formed can no longer be ful-
filled, it is dissolved. In such a situation the court should find
that the intent of the parties and the nature of the contract were
such that if the unit as formed can no longer promote conserva-
tion or insure to the owner of each tract his just and equitable
share of production from the unit acreage, it is dissolved.
An analogous situation was presented in the Texas case of
Struss v. Stoddard.19 The unit agreement under consideration
provided that it was to become "null and void" if drilling opera-
tions were not commenced within 120 days from the effective date
of the agreement. Upon the drilling of a dry hole, the lessees
abandoned drilling operations under the agreement and began
paying delay rentals as provided for in their respective leases
if a well was not drilled. The court held that the lessors by ac-
cepting these delay rentals waived any rights that they might
have had in the unit. Although the court's decision seems to be
grounded in some form of estoppel, the practical result of the
case indicates that a producing well was contemplated by the
unit agreement to maintain its existence. As one author has
pointed out,20 the court indicated in dictum that even in the ab-
sence of an express provision for termination, a dry hole will
cause such termination as a matter of law. In Texaco, Inc. v. Let-
terman,21 the court was faced with a similar problem of deter-
17. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 214 So.2d 795, 805 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
18. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2026.
19. 258 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
20. L. HOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING & UNITIZATION 129 (1954).
21. 343 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
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mining whether a unit had terminated. In that case, two of the
three leases included within the unit had expired. The court,
concluding that the unit had expired, stated: "With two of the
three leases making up the . ..unit terminating by their own
terms, we fail to see how the unit could survive. A unitized unit
is wholly dependent upon existing mineral leases. '22
Obviously, the problem of determining the time at which a
declared unit terminates can be avoided by including in the unit
agreement an express provision to the effect that if the purpose
for the unit cannot be achieved, it will terminate. However,
such a provision is unlikely to be found in a standard pooling
clause. The landowner-lessor usually has no control over the
pooling provision in the lease in that the lessee prepares the lease
and is in such a bargaining position as to give the landowner
little or no voice in the terms of the lease. It is submitted that
the courts should hold a declared unit subject to a resolutory
condition that would terminate the unit if the purposes for its
existence should cease. The McDonald case has the practical ef-
fect of continuing the existence of a declared unit beyond the
point at which the parties should be presumed to have intended
it to terminate. Despite evidence in the record to the contrary,
the court found that a significant portion of the unit had not been
proven totally unproductive. The dry hole had been drilled into
the shale sheath of a salt dome.'Consequently, any drilling south of
the dry hole would be into this shale sheath and non-productive.
In light of these facts the court's conclusion that the purpose
for the unit's formation had not ceased, appears questionable, and
it is hoped that under a similar factual situation in the future,
the court will undertake to reconsider its view.
Wood T. Sparks
22. Id. at 731.
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